Decoupled Alignment for Robust Plug-and-Play Adaptation

Haozheng Luo[1*] **Jiahao Yu**[2*] **Wenxin Zhang**[1*] **Jialong Li**[3]

Chenghao Qiu[4] **Yimin Wang**[5] **Hanchen Jiang**[5] **Jerry Yao-Chieh Hu**[1]

Yan Chen[1] **Binghui Wang**[6] **Xinyu Xing**[1] **Han Liu**[1]

[1] Northwestern University [2] New York University Abu Dhabi [3] Stanford University
[4] Texas A&M University [5] University of California, Los Angeles [6] Illinois Institute of Technology

{hluo, wenxinzhang2025, jialongli2024, jhu}@u.northwestern.edu
jy5951@nyu.edu chenghaoqiu@tamu.edu bwang70@illinoistech.edu
{yiminw, ericjiang0318}@ucla.edu
{hanliu, xinyu.xing, ychen}@northwestern.edu

Abstract

Content Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language.

We introduce a training-free safety enhancement method for aligning large language models (LLMs) without the need of supervised fine-tuning or reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our main idea is to provide a robust plug-and-play approach to prevent shadow alignment when models are adapted to downstream tasks. Specifically, we leverage knowledge distillation to extract alignment signals from well-aligned LLMs and inject them into shadow-aligned models via model fusion, enabling a plug-and-play alignment correction. In our methodology, we employ delta debugging to identify the critical components of knowledge necessary for effective distillation. On the harmful question dataset, our method significantly enhances the average defense success rate by approximately 14.42%, reaching as high as 51.39%, in 17 influenced LLMs, without compromising performance. Our code is available at https://github.com/NWULIST/DAPA.

1 Introduction

With large language models (LLMs) increasingly adopted across a wide range of applications, their ability to generate high-quality, human-like text has been well demonstrated (Guo et al., 2025; Grattafiori et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024). However, growing concerns have emerged over their potential to generate harmful content (Shao et al., 2026; Ramesh et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025; Yu et al., 2025; 2024a; Chao et al., 2023). To address these concerns, several methods have been developed to enhance model alignment with ethical and safety guidelines. For instance, models such as Llama-2-Chat (Touvron et al., 2023) and Gemma-it (Team et al., 2024) have undergone extensive fine-tuning to improve their alignment performance. However, such approaches often rely heavily on *computationally intensive resources* and *manual red-teaming*, making them expensive and time-consuming (Qi et al., 2025; Hu et al., 2024d; OpenAI, 2024).

Consequently, with the rapid development of LLMs, many third-party developers increasingly rely on existing well-aligned base models to build specialized systems for reasoning (Guo et al., 2025; Agarwal et al., 2025), vision (Liu et al., 2024a; Bai et al., 2023b), and speech (Wu et al., 2024c; Chu et al., 2023). However, recent studies (Hsu et al., 2024; Lermen & Rogers-Smith, 2024; Yang et al., 2023) show that adaptation methods—such as fine-tuning, LoRA insertion, or task-specific alignment—can inadvertently erode or override the original

[*]These authors contributed equally to this work.

safety alignment of these base models, re-introducing harmful or unaligned behaviors. We refer to this degradation of safety alignment caused by downstream adaptation as *shadow alignment* (Yang et al., 2023), which often forces developers to perform additional realignment to restore model safety.

To address this challenge, we introduce **D**ecoupled **A**lignment for Robust **P**lug-and-Play **A**daptation (termed DAPA), a *training-free* safety enhancement framework for aligning LLMs. We mainly draw inspiration from knowledge distillation (Uppaal et al., 2025; Grimes et al., 2025; Mansourian et al., 2025; Hahn & Choi, 2019), wherein knowledge is transferred from a teacher model to a student model. Given access to a single *well-aligned* teacher model, DAPA aligns other *shadow alignment influenced* LLMs within the same model family to ethical guidelines, without requiring supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF).

Specifically, through a series of numerical experiments (see Figure 2 and Figure 7), we first uncover two key findings:

- **MLP Alignment:** Alignment knowledge is predominantly stored in the Feed-Forward Network (FFN), or MLP layers.
- **Gate Alignment:** Within these MLP layers, the gate layers play a crucial role in determining whether model outputs align with ethical constraints.

Then, building on these insights, we propose to leverage memory editing techniques (Meng et al., 2022a;b) to transfer alignment knowledge from a well-aligned LLM to an influenced counterpart within the same model family. In particular, we first present a delta debugging-based search algorithm to address the challenge of pinpointing the memory space (gate layers) responsible for alignment performance. This allows us to locate the alignment-related modules for memory editing via knowledge distillation. We then apply model fusion (see Section 3.2), transferring alignment-related modules from an aligned model into the target model to achieve a low-cost yet effective safety improvement.

We extensively evaluate DAPA on 17 LLMs from three popular families (Llama2, Mistral, and Gemma) on various metrics including cosine similarity scores, model perplexity, few-shot prompting, and Chain-of-Thought (CoT). Our results show DAPA-aligned LLMs have an average 14.42% increase in defense success rate, with minimal computational effort (adapting *at most* 8.11% model parameters) and marginally affecting the model's benign functionality—e.g., the average increase in perplexity is only 1.69, and the average drop in model reasoning ability is only 2.59%. These results indicate that DAPA offers a timely, robust, and economic solution for enhancing LLM safety, enabling more efficient and accessible alignment across the open LLM ecosystem.

Contribution. Our main contributions are summarized below.

- We design a novel safety enhancement method, DAPA (as shown in Figure 15), for re-aligning LLMs affected by shadow alignment. DAPA utilizes memory editing technology to identify the memory space responsible for alignment performance. Unlike prior alignment strategies, DAPA requires *neither intensive computation nor manual intervention* such as red-teaming or fine-tuning (Dai et al., 2024).
- We present a latent-space analysis (Section 2) that sheds light on shadow alignment, and introduce a model-fusion–based knowledge editing method that improves safety without degrading task performance, supported by a detailed theoretical analysis.
- Extensive experimental results validate the effectiveness, robustness, and efficiency of DAPA to enhance LLM safety alignment.

2 Memory Editing

We consider the popular autoregressive LLM that generates text by predicting the next token in a sequence given the previous tokens. To locate the association of ethical memory within the parameters of an autoregressive LLM, we begin by analyzing and identifying the hidden states that exhibit the strongest correlation with this concept. Here, ethical memory



Figure 1: **The Transformer Architecture.** We describe the architecture of Transformer utilized by state-of-the-art LLMs such as Llama (Touvron et al., 2023) and Gemma (Team et al., 2024). Each Transformer block combines an attention mechanism with MLP layers (comprising Up, Gate, and Down modules). This figure illustrates the transition of the model's hidden representation from the previous state to the next state.



Figure 2: **Visualizing Attention, MLP, and All Modules on Memory Space.** We visualize the influence of unethical prompt tokens on the results using the aligned Llama-2-7B-chat model to identify memory space. This includes examining the effects on attention, MLP, and all modules.

refers to the subset of internal representations—specifically, model neurons—that store safety-relevant information, enabling the model to produce morally aligned and socially responsible outputs.

Denote a sequence of tokens as $\{\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2, \ldots, \mathbf{s}_T\}$. In the l-layer of an autoregressive LLM, the tokens $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}$ are embedded into a sequence of hidden states $\{\mathbf{h}_i^{(l)}\}$. The final output of an L-layer LLM $y = \text{decode}(\mathbf{h}_T^{(L)})$ is generated by the decoder layer from the final layer hidden state. Autoregressive LLMs often use Transformer as the building blocks (For further background on Transformer, please refer to Vaswani et al. (2017). In Figure 1, we visualize the internal computation of a Transformer block. Each layer l (left $\rightarrow$ right) of the Transformer block adds a self-attention mechanism $\mathbf{a}_i^{(l)}$ and local MLP $\mathbf{M}_i^{(l)}$ from previous layers. Each MLP is a three-layer neural network parameterized by $\mathbf{W}_{\text{up}}$, $\mathbf{W}_{\text{gate}}$, and $\mathbf{W}_{\text{down}}$, along with a SwiGLU (Shazeer, 2020) or GELU (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) activation function in popular LLMs, such as Llama (Touvron et al., 2023), Gemma (Team et al., 2024). Formally, the i-th layer hidden state for a token $\mathbf{s}_i$ in Transformer is calculated below:

$$\mathbf{h}_i^{(l)} = \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)} + \mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{M}_i^{(l)}, \quad \mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} = \text{attn}^{(l)}(\mathbf{h}_1^{(l-1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_T^{(l-1)}),$$
$$\mathbf{M}_i^{(l)} = \mathbf{W}_{\text{down}}^{(l)} \sigma(\mathbf{W}_{\text{gate}}^{(l)} \gamma(\mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)})) \odot \mathbf{W}_{\text{up}}^{(l)} \gamma(\mathbf{a}_i^{(l)} + \mathbf{h}_i^{(l-1)}).$$

Storage of Alignment Knowledge. We first adopt a knowledge-editing-style causal tracing analysis (Meng et al., 2022a) to identify the model components that are most *alignment-sensitive*. Using an unethical prompt on Llama-2-7B-chat, we corrupt all hidden states as shown in Figure 1, then restore one selected hidden state at a time, and measure the resulting change in output probability relative to the fully corrupted run; we refer to this quantity as



Figure 3: **PCA of safety representations.** We analyze the safety latent space by applying PCA to the last-token logits of 256 AdvBench samples from Qwen2.5-7B (base), Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, and Qwen2.5-Math-1.5B-Instruct. In both projection directions, the safety-aligned instruct model is clearly separated from the unaligned base model, while the math-instruct model—obtained by downstream fine-tuning from the instruct checkpoint—shows a modest shift toward the unsafe region, illustrating the shadow alignment effect.

the *indirect effect* of that hidden state. By repeating this procedure across all hidden states, we find that hidden states in the middle layers have the strongest influence on aligned behavior, with MLP layers—especially gate-related components—showing larger indirect effects than attention layers, consistent with (Meng et al., 2022a). These results indicate that the model components most critical for aligned behavior are concentrated in the middle MLP layers. We provide additional visualizations in Section K.11.

To better understand the impact of each module in the MLP layers towards the alignment knowledge, we customize the knowledge editing technology (Meng et al., 2022a) to visualize the indirect effects of the gate, up, and down projections, as shown in Section C.

Safety Vector Extraction and Representation. Figure 3 visualizes the *safety latent space* by applying PCA to the *last-token logits* of 256 harmful prompts from AdvBench. Compared with the base model, the instruct-aligned checkpoint occupies a clearly separated region in this space, indicating that safety alignment induces a systematic shift in the representations of harmful inputs. In contrast, the downstream `math-instruct` model, despite being initialized from the instruct model, exhibits a noticeable drift toward the region of the unsafe base model. This suggests that downstream fine-tuning partially attenuates the safety-relevant representational shift acquired during alignment. Consequently, safety is not completely removed but becomes insufficiently preserved, leading to the phenomenon referred to as *shadow alignment*, in which responses to harmful prompts move closer to the pre-alignment regime.

This observation reveals a direct geometric interpretation that motivates the subsequent DAPA design. In particular, DAPA is formulated as a two-stage framework that (i) identifies *safety-critical representation vectors* that capture the alignment-induced shift, and (ii) applies *model fusion* as a lightweight memory-editing mechanism to re-inject these safety components into the downstream-tuned model, thereby restoring safety while limiting interference with downstream capability. The implementation formulas and technical details are presented in Section 3.2.

3 DAPA

We present DAPA, a two-stage alignment framework that first identifies safety-critical representation vectors via delta debugging and then applies model fusion as a memory-editing mechanism to restore model safety.

3.1 Delta Debugging

Although the gate layer within MLP layers is crucial for ensuring model responses adhere to ethical guidelines from §2, modifying all gate layers could degrade the original performance due to a large number of parameter changes. We propose a strategy to efficiently identify the optimal memory space for targeted modifications, enhancing alignment while preserving performance.

We incorporate delta debugging (Zeller & Hildebrandt, 2002) in our strategy. Delta debugging is a systematic approach that automates the debugging process by identifying the smallest set of changes responsible for a program's failure. It reduces the set of changes, testing progressively smaller subsets until pinpointing the precise cause of the failure. In DAPA, we consider it a program failure when LLMs provide an unethical response to an unethical question. To demonstrate how delta debugging works in DAPA, let $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{S}$ be a memory space where $\mathbb{S}$ is the universe memory of all MLP modules.

A policy is defined by the function $\pi : \mathbb{S} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where if $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 1$, it indicates that the memory space $\mathbf{S}$ is beneficial for enhancing alignment, and if $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 0$, it indicates that the memory space $\mathbf{S}$ does not contribute to improving alignment. Given an aligned model memory space $\mathbf{S}$ and policy π, we aim to find the smallest memory space $\mathbf{S}^* \in \mathbb{S}$ in the aligned model which can most efficiently improve the unaligned ability to defend the jailbreak. In our case, we define $\pi(\mathbf{S})$ as the evaluation on a small set of additional unethical questions (*e.g.*, 5% of preserved data). If the model provides ethical responses to all these questions, we set $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 1$; otherwise, $\pi(\mathbf{S}) = 0$.

Algorithm 1 Memory Search Algorithm in DAPA

Require: Aligned Model MLP Memory Space $\mathbb{S}$
Require: A policy function π
Ensure: The smallest memory space $\mathbf{S}^*$ for the editing

```
L ← A List memory space set of S
n ← 2
while n ≤ |L| do
    ⟨s_1, ..., s_n⟩ ← split L into n partitions
    if ∃i, π(s_i) = 1 then
        ⟨L, n⟩ ← ⟨s_i, 2⟩
    else if ∃i, π(L \ s_i) = 1 then
        ⟨L, n⟩ ← ⟨L \ s_i, n − 1⟩
    else
        ⟨L, n⟩ ← ⟨L, 2n⟩
    end if
end while
return S* corresponding to L
```

We next briefly describe the delta debugging process in our aligner, as shown in Algorithm 1. Given the input memory space of aligned model $\mathbb{S}$, number of partition $n = 2$ and a list of memory space set L of $\mathbb{S}$. we first split the memory space into n partitions. We then check if there exists a partition s_i such that $\pi(s_i) = 1$. If such a partition exists, we update the memory space to s_i and update $n = 2$. Otherwise, we check if there exists a partition s_i such that $\pi(L \setminus s_i) = 1$. If such a partition exists, we update the memory space to $L \setminus s_i$ and set $n = n - 1$. If neither of the above conditions are met, we double the number of partitions n. We repeat this process until n is greater than the number of partitions in the memory space. Finally, we return the memory space $\mathbf{S}^*$ corresponding to the updated memory space L. The worst-case complexity of this algorithm is $O(L \cdot \log L)$.

To demonstrate the efficiency of our memory space searching algorithm, we employ the Llama-2-7b model as a case study to illustrate how Algorithm 1 navigates the memory space for alignment, as shown in Section D.

3.2 Model Fusion

We employ model fusion as a targeted memory-editing mechanism to correct shadow safety misalignment. Specifically, model A denotes a safety-aligned model, model B denotes a

non-aligned base model, and model C denotes a downstream-aligned model derived from A. We compute a safety vector $\mathbf{v}_s$ from the representation difference between A and B, which is identified via the delta debugging procedure described in Section 3.1. This vector captures the representation shift induced by safety alignment and serves as a compact encoding of alignment-related knowledge. At the representation level, the effect of model fusion on $\mathbf{h}_C$ of model C can be expressed as

$$\mathbf{h}_{C_{\text{align}}} = \mathbf{h}_{C_{\text{org}}} + \lambda \mathbf{v}_s \tag{3.1}$$

where λ controls the strength of the safety correction. We estimate λ via linear regression by evaluating the fused model C_{align} on a subset of 20 training samples from R2D-R1 (Zhu et al., 2025) and selecting the smallest value that improves safety, as measured by the Defense Success Rate (DSR) defined in Section 4, while minimizing interference with downstream task performance.

Table 1: **Comparing** DAPA **in 3 Common LLM Families.** We demonstrate the improvement in alignment capabilities of unaligned models through our DAPA aligner across 17 models using DSR. We also assess the linguistic performance after alignment, reporting average perplexity and Cosine Similarity scores. DAPA consistently achieves a significant increase in DSR, with an average gain of 14.42% and a maximum of 51.39%. Meanwhile, the average accuracy on the MMLU dataset using 5-shot prompting drops by 2.06% and perplexity increases by 1.69. Overall, DAPA enhances DSR significantly while maintaining the original capabilities of the models with minimal impact.

Family	Model Name	DSR		Perplexity		MMLU		Cosine Similarity
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	
Llama-2	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	82.03	**87.50**	7.54	**7.46**	**38.71** $\pm$ 0.41	37.43 $\pm$ 1.42	0.88
	Llama-2-7b	37.16	**42.19**	**4.77**	4.78	36.37 $\pm$ 1.01	**39.30** $\pm$ 0.00	0.79
	Llama-2-13b	37.50	**46.09**	4.28	**4.28**	34.74 $\pm$ 2.46	**37.08** $\pm$ 1.33	0.76
	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	70.31	**85.16**	5.63	**5.60**	**48.77** $\pm$ 0.70	47.60 $\pm$ 1.07	0.91
	Redmond-Puffin-13B	22.66	**47.66**	4.30	**4.30**	30.06 $\pm$ 0.88	**32.38** $\pm$ 1.22	0.89
Mistral	Mistral-7B	21.09	**25.78**	**4.58**	4.60	45.38 $\pm$ 1.66	**47.72** $\pm$ 0.70	0.76
	OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7b	33.59	**46.88**	**5.00**	5.02	41.29 $\pm$ 0.81	**42.46** $\pm$ 1.22	0.88
	dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	24.22	**41.41**	**5.18**	5.19	**60.12** $\pm$ 0.41	58.25 $\pm$ 1.05	0.90
	zephyr-7b-alpha	24.22	**32.81**	5.11	**5.11**	54.04 $\pm$ 1.53	**56.73** $\pm$ 0.41	0.88
	mistral-7B-forest-dpo	**19.38**	15.62	5.13	**5.10**	**54.62** $\pm$ 0.88	54.04 $\pm$ 0.61	0.72
	dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	24.22	**55.47**	**5.41**	5.42	60.47 $\pm$ 0.20	**62.69** $\pm$ 0.54	0.91
	openchat-3.5	58.68	**67.19**	5.15	**5.10**	**61.40** $\pm$ 0.35	58.71 $\pm$ 0.41	0.89
Gemma	gemma-2b	22.05	**73.44**	**7.92**	24.15	**33.57** $\pm$ 0.41	24.80 $\pm$ 2.06	0.33
	Gemmalpaca-2B	37.01	**51.56**	**9.92**	22.00	**40.94** $\pm$ 0.81	21.17 $\pm$ 1.42	0.51
	gemma-7b	26.56	**34.38**	**6.09**	6.27	39.65 $\pm$ 1.75	**42.11** $\pm$ 0.93	0.66
	gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	34.15	**41.41**	**7.17**	7.48	**42.11** $\pm$ 0.00	29.24 $\pm$ 0.54	0.76
	gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	21.88	**35.16**	**7.22**	7.42	**42.26** $\pm$ 0.61	38.01 $\pm$ 0.88	0.76
Average Change		34.39	48.81	5.91	7.60	44.98 $\pm$ 0.88	42.92 $\pm$ 1.00	0.87

4 Experimental Studies

We perform a series of experiments to evaluate DAPA in enhancing the alignment performance of unaligned models against unethical prompts, in §4.1. We also assess the impact of the DAPA aligner on the model's performance in §4.2, including linguistic capabilities and reasoning abilities. Lastly, we conduct an ablation study in §4.3 to examine how the choice of fusion layer affects both model safety and overall performance.

Models and Parameter Efficiency. We validate our method on 17 widely-used LLMs from 3 different families, reported in Table 4 in Appendix. These models include both foundational and fine-tuned models, with the fine-tuning approach including SFT, DPO, and RLHF. Further, Table 4 classifies the models based on their family and the aligned and unaligned models. We defer the details of these aligned and unaligned models in Appendix H. In our experiments, we identify the layers for model fusion using delta debugging (Algorithm 1). In Table 4, we also report that the DAPA aligner is very parameter-efficient. DAPA not only updates an average of 6.26% of parameters across 3 model families, it also updates as little as 3.25% parameters in the commonly used Llama-2-7b.

4.1 Alignment Performance

To evaluate DAPA's effectiveness in aligning unaligned models, we substitute the relative memory in 17 models with DAPA's configuration and assess their performance in defending against jailbreak attacks. Because we set the response generation with deterministic, the variance of the evaluation is 0. As a result, we only need to run one evaluation for each model.

Dataset. In our experiment, we use the AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b) to validate the performance of DAPA. It is a benchmark dataset that contains various unethical prompts to evaluate the alignment of language models, encompassing different categories such as violence, hate speech, and misinformation. We sample 128 prompts from the AdvBench dataset to form our evaluation dataset.

Metrics. We employ the Defense Success Rate (DSR) as the primary metric to evaluate the alignment performance. For each unethical prompt, if the model provides a refusal or an ethical response, it is considered aligned. To automatically evaluate the model's responses, we combine LLM judgments with gpt-4o and rule-based classifiers to determine if the model's response is refusal or ethical. For LLM judgment, we use the system prompt provided in Yu et al. (2024a) to guide the LLM to evaluate the response. For rule-based classifiers, we employ and expand the keyword list like "Sorry, as an" or "As a responsible" provided in Zou et al. (2023b) to classify the response. If the response contains any of the keywords, it is classified as a refusal. A response is deemed aligned if it is classified as refusal or ethical by both the LLM and rule-based classifiers.

Results. In Table 1, our results show that DAPA achieves performance in increasing the alignment on unaligned models, achieving a 14.42% average increase in DSR across all 17 models. Notably, the *gemma-2b* model achieves a significant 51.39% increase in DSR. These improvements in DSR underscore DAPA aligner's effectiveness in enhancing model safety against jailbreak prompts.

4.2 Model Performance

To assess the model's performance before and after DAPA alignment, we evaluate the generative and reasoning capabilities in a deterministic setting. For each pre-alignment and post-alignment model, we measure the model's generative ability using perplexity and assess the response variation caused by the DAPA alignment through cosine similarity score. We also validate the model's reasoning ability by employing real-life question-answering and STEM problem-solving tasks, using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022) and few shot prompting approach. We conduct each evaluation three times and present the average and standard deviation for each metric.

Dataset. We employ six real-world datasets: ShareGPT (Chiang et al., 2023), WikiText-2 (Merity et al., 2017), Big-Bench (Srivastava et al., 2023) (TruthQA, General QA, SocialQA), HarmfulQA (Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023), JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024) and MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021). ShareGPT is used for computing the cosine similarity score of model responses, Wiki8-2 assesses model perplexity, and MMLU and Big-Bench evaluate the model's problem-solving and reasoning abilities.

Metrics. In our experiment, we evaluate the responses generated by both pre-alignment model and post-alignment model. We use cosine similarity to measure the impact of the aligner on model response generation. Additionally, we use perplexity for comparative analysis of the models' generative capabilities. A high cosine similarity score or comparable perplexity indicates using our aligner improves the defense success rate while maintaining the original performance. Additionally, to evaluate the model's reasoning abilities, we administer real-life question-answering and STEM problem-solving tasks, measuring performance with the Exact Match (EM) metric.

Setup. We assess post-alignment performance by examining reasoning capacity, response similarity, and perplexity. In all experiments, we use the model both before and after the

Table 2: **Comparing DAPA with CoT Abilities in 3 Common LLM Families.** We conduct an experiment to evaluate the impact of DAPA on CoT capabilities using the Exact Match (EM) score. The DAPA aligner reduces the average EM of the Chain of Action (CoA) method on the Big-Bench dataset by 2.77%, indicating a significant effect on the model's original reasoning abilities.

Family	Model Name	TruthQA		GK		SocialQA	
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Llama-2	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	20.67 ± 2.08	**24.67** ± 2.08	38.10 ± 7.05	**40.00** ± 1.43	**21.67** ± 2.31	19.67 ± 3.21
	Llama-2-7b	**36.67** ± 3.51	27.00 ± 3.51	**58.57** ± 7.14	46.67 ± 5.95	22.33 ± 2.52	**24.00** ± 7.21
	Llama-2-13b	**39.33** ± 2.52	24.67 ± 4.93	**64.76** ± 2.97	45.24 ± 5.95	**39.33** ± 2.52	22.67 ± 3.06
	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	35.33 ± 5.13	**36.33** ± 5.51	40.48 ± 9.72	**49.05** ± 6.44	**35.33** ± 5.13	19.00 ± 3.61
	Redmond-Puffin-13B	**33.67** ± 0.58	24.67 ± 4.04	**55.71** ± 4.29	41.43 ± 1.43	**33.67** ± 0.58	19.00 ± 3.61
Mistral	Mistral-7B	**34.00** ± 1.73	33.67 ± 2.08	**79.05** ± 2.97	77.14 ± 2.47	**39.33** ± 3.51	37.67 ± 2.08
	OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7b	39.67 ± 3.51	**42.33** ± 5.51	67.14 ± 1.43	**71.43** ± 4.29	30.00 ± 2.65	**40.00** ± 1.73
	dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	**51.00** ± 4.00	48.33 ± 3.21	85.24 ± 2.18	**85.71** ± 2.47	53.00 ± 2.52	**53.00** ± 1.00
	zephyr-7b-alpha	35.00 ± 1.00	**42.67** ± 3.06	64.76 ± 7.87	**71.90** ± 2.97	44.00 ± 3.21	**46.00** ± 7.51
	mistral-7B-forest-dpo	41.00 ± 3.00	**47.33** ± 6.33	71.43 ± 3.78	**75.71** ± 4.29	38.33 ± 6.03	**40.00** ± 4.58
	dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	**48.67** ± 2.08	46.33 ± 2.89	87.14 ± 2.47	**90.00** ± 0.00	**39.33** ± 3.51	30.00 ± 1.01
	openchat-3.5	49.67 ± 4.93	**55.67** ± 1.53	**84.76** ± 2.18	83.81± 2.97	**61.00** ± 6.56	56.00 ± 2.65
Gemma	gemma-2b	**29.33** ± 5.77	29.00 ± 3.61	**51.43** ± 3.78	43.81 ± 2.18	**29.00** ± 3.61	15.67 ± 2.52
	Gemmalpaca-2B	**33.67** ± 3.21	31.67 ± 2.52	**61.43** ± 1.43	52.38 ± 6.75	**41.00** ± 4.58	16.33 ± 2.08
	gemma-7b	49.33 ± 4.16	**50.00** ± 3.00	88.10 ± 1.65	**89.52** ± 4.12	**42.00** ± 2.89	35.33 ± 2.52
	gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	27.67 ± 4.04	**29.33** ± 3.51	**68.10** ± 9.51	60.00 ± 9.90	13.33 ± 2.52	**15.33** ± 3.21
	gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	**41.33** ± 2.08	39.33 ± 1.53	**80.48** ± 2.18	79.52 ± 0.82	29.00 ± 3.61	**38.33** ± 3.51
Average Change		38.00 ± 3.14	37.24 ± 3.45	67.45 ± 4.27	64.90 ± 3.95	36.04 ± 3.43	31.04 ± 3.24

adapter in a deterministic output setting. In the response similarity test, we compare the average similarity of responses on the same generated question. For comparing model responses, we embed responses from both models using the text-embedding-3-small model* and analyze 128 questions sampled from ShareGPT. In the perplexity test, we compute the perplexity score with Huggingface Evaluate* on Wiki8-2 dataset (Merity et al., 2017). In assessing model reasoning capacity, we conduct tests using 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset (Brown et al., 2020) and Chain-of-Action (CoA) (Pan et al., 2025; 2024) methodology on the Big-Bench dataset, excluding memory retrieval. We conduct each evaluation three times and present the average and standard deviation for each metric.

Table 3: **The Comparison of Defense Models with DAPA on Llama, Gemma Models, and Mistral Models in AdvBench.** We conduct experiments to compare the performance of DAPA with RepE on Llama, Gemma, and Mistral Models. On average, DAPA achieves a DSR 13% higher than RepE. The model names corresponding to each label are provided in Section S.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
RepE	34	80	40	73	21	27	34	37	27	29	23	35	28	32	24	9	64	**36**
ICD	43	84	42	79	34	56	44	30	33	31	20	40	34	29	34	11	66	**42**
Guardrails	39	84	40	73	25	24	39	29	36	24	23	36	27	27	27	22	61	**37**
Safety Arithmetic	41	85	41	77	31	44	42	30	33	28	21	39	31	28	31	15	65	**40**
InferAligner	44	87	44	81	37	61	46	32	36	32	22	41	35	31	39	13	68	**44**
Model Surgery	43	86	44	82	40	63	48	32	38	33	23	43	37	31	45	14	67	**45**
Safe LoRA	44	87	45	84	45	69	50	33	40	34	25	45	39	32	51	15	67	**47**
Ours	42	88	46	85	48	73	52	34	41	35	26	47	41	33	55	16	67	**49**

Results. In Table 1, our findings indicate that the average perplexity increases by 1.69, with the Llama-2-13b model showing no change. In one special case, the Gemme-2B family's models display the most significant increase in perplexity, at 16.23. Additionally, the average cosine similarity is 0.87, with Dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo achieving the highest similarity of 0.91. Those indicate that the system does not adversely affect the original capabilities of the language model. Additionally, in Table 1, our finding indicate the average accuracy drops by 2.06% using 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset. Most models exhibit only slight changes in accuracy. Overall, DAPA preserves utility for most models, but we observe two

*https://openai.com/blog/new-embedding-models-and-api-updates
*https://huggingface.co/docs/evaluate/index

clear failure cases: Gemmalpaca-2B and Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT, whose MMLU scores drop by 19.77% and 12.87%, respectively. We attribute these failures to increased sensitivity to layer-level fusion: Gemmalpaca-2B has limited parameter redundancy due to its small scale, while Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT is likely more fragile because prior task-specific SFT already reshaped its internal representations, making subsequent fusion more prone to interfering with the model's original knowledge organization. We also provide additional experimental results for the 0-shot and 1-shot settings in Section K.4.

In Table 2, our results show a 2.77% average accuracy decrease using the CoA methodology on the Big-Bench datasets. In one exception, OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B shows the most significant improvement, achieving a 10% increase in accuracy on SocialQA dataset, while Gemma-alpaca-2B shows the largest decrease, with a 24% decrease on the SocialQA dataset.

Overall, these findings regarding models' perplexity, responses' cosine similarity, and performance on the real-life question-answering and problem-solving tests indicate that the DAPA aligner does not significantly impair the models' performance after using DAPA aligner.



Figure 4: **Impact of Parameter Change on Model Performance.**

4.3 Ablation Study

We performed extensive ablation studies; here we highlight two key results, with the remaining experiments provided in Section E.

Comparison with Other Defense Methods. We use the alignment method described in Representative Engineering (RepE) (Zou et al., 2023a), ICD (Wei et al., 2026), InferAligner (Wang et al., 2024b), Safety Arithmetic (Hazra et al., 2024), Safe LoRA (Hsu et al., 2024), Model Surgery (Wang et al., 2025a), LLM Guardrails (DONG et al., 2024) as baseline to compare other alignment methodologies. Specifically, we use **Llama Guard 2** (Team, 2024) as a representative example of an LLM guardrail system in our experiments. The average DSR was calculated using 128 questions from the AdvBench dataset, under the same evaluation settings as DAPA. The results are shown in Table 3. Our analysis shows that DAPA achieves an average DSR that is 2% higher than Safe LoRA, the strongest baseline defense method. The result demonstrates that DAPA significantly outperforms the baseline alignment methodology across different models.

Impact of Parameter Change on Model Performance. We investigate how different parameter update ratios influence model performance using *Chinese-Alpaca-2-7B* and *Llama-2-7B* as representative architectures. As shown in Figure 4, increasing the parameter change from 0% to 2% leads to about a 10% variation in DSR performance, indicating that model robustness remains largely unaffected by small-scale adaptation. Specifically, our configuration with a 3.25% parameter change (five-layer modification) achieves near-optimal DSR values comparable to those with higher parameter budgets. This demonstrates that DAPA can effectively enhance safety alignment and maintain reasoning capability with minimal parameter updates.

4.4 DAPA Performance on Large Multimodal Models

To assess the robustness of our method in multimodal models, we perform alignment using DAPA on the LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023) model. Many multimodal models, such as LLaVA and Qwen-VL (Bai et al., 2023b), are built on existing language and other modality foundation models. In this section, we focus on analyzing the general question-answering task in vision-language models, as it represents a critical area for addressing multimodal safety issues (Liu et al., 2024c). Since the general question-answering task generates text-based responses, we apply DAPA to the language model module. We use the LLaVA-1.5-7b [*] as

[*]https://huggingface.co/llava-hf/llava-1.5-7b-hf

the unaligned model and LLaVA-1.6-vicuna-7b [*] (Liu et al., 2024a) as the teacher model to do the alignment. We use 103 questions in the HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024) to evaluate the result. In Figure 5, our results demonstrate that DAPA achieves an impressive 24.27% increase in DSR. This highlights the ability of DAPA to effectively extend to the large multimodal models. We present a multimodal defense example using DAPA in Section K.12.

Figure 5: **Left:** DAPA Performance under Llama3 70B Model. We conduct experiments under the DAPA attack, where our DAPA achieves an average improvement of 10% compared to the unaligned model. **Right:** DAPA Performance on LLaVA-1.5-7b multimodal model. After DAPA alignment, the DSR increases by 24.27%.



Figure 6: **DAPA Performance under GCG attack.** We conduct experiments under the DAPA attack, where our DAPA achieves an average improvement of 9.62% compared to the unaligned model.

DAPA **Performance with GCG Attack.** To evaluate the robustness of our method, DAPA, against advanced jailbreak attack methods, we align the Llama-2 family model using the GCG (Zou et al., 2023b) attack. As shown in Figure 6, our results demonstrate that DAPA achieves a 9.62% increase in DSR.

DAPA **Performance Under Other Advanced Jailbreak Attack.** We evaluate three advanced jailbreak attacks: GPTFuzzer (Yu et al., 2024a), and AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024b). To assess the performance of DAPA under the GPTFuzzer attack, we compare its performance improvement against unaligned Llama-2 family models. As shown in Figure 9, our results demonstrate that DAPA achieves a 16.62% increase in DSR. We also provide additional experimental results for AutoDAN in Section K.9.

DAPA **Performance on Large-size Models.** To evaluate the robustness of DAPA on large-scale language models, we perform alignment experiments using the Llama 3 70B model. We use the Hermes-3-Llama-3.1-70B-Uncensored as the unaligned model and Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct as the teacher model for alignment. We assess the performance of DAPA in 70B models using Advbench. As shown in Figure 5, the DSR rate improved from 50% before alignment to 60% after alignment.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

We introduce the Decoupled Alignment for Robust Plug-and-Play Adaptation, DAPA, which edits the unaligned model memory to enhance the model's defenses against jailbreak attacks. This method improves model alignment without the substantial computational expense typically associated with fine-tuning. It also efficiently identifies the optimal memory space for alignment. Visualizations confirm that the ethical boundary of model alignment is predominantly situated within the middle MLP's gate layers. Empirically, DAPA achieves a 14.42% improvement in model alignment, reaching up to 51.39% in one of the Gemma family models, with an average parameter change of only 6.26%. Moreover, DAPA minimally impacts the model's performance in generation and reasoning tasks.

[*]https://huggingface.co/llava-hf/llava-v1.6-vicuna-7b-hf

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Ethics statement

This work proposes a training-free red-teaming alignment approach to address the shallow alignment challenge, leveraging knowledge distillation and delta debugging. In line with the COLM Code of Ethics[*], we acknowledge that our code includes jailbreak attack implementations, which could potentially be misused to compromise large language models, and that our paper demonstrates examples of harmful content. Moreover, knowledge distillation may propagate or amplify biases in model outputs. To mitigate the potential risks of our work, we adopt several precautionary measures. We begin by providing a clear content warning to alert readers of the harmful language present in our examples. We also notify model providers of the risks associated with DAPA prior to submission and offer practical recommendations to address these risks. To promote transparency and reproducibility, we open-source the code and data used in our experiments. Finally, we outline recommendations for future research aimed at mitigating the risks of DAPA and encourage the community to develop robust defenses against such attacks.

Reproducibility statement

To ensure reproducibility, we release an open-source repository containing the full implementation of DAPA and selected baselines, with plans for full open-sourcing upon acceptance. Unless otherwise specified, all experiments are conducted with three random seeds, yielding stable results with standard deviations below 2%. We set the temperature to 0 for all deployment experiments. All other hyperparameters for attack and baseline defense methods are kept consistent with their original papers.

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A Broader Impact

Our proposal improves LLMs' defenses against jailbreak attacks. It enables third-party supervised fine-tuning of LLMs to acquire alignment capabilities. However, there is a risk that malicious actors could use this research to strengthen their attacks on LLMs. Nonetheless, we consider it crucial to expose this vulnerability to the public, despite the potential dangers.

B Additional Related Work

Shallow Alignment. With the rapid development of LLMs, people increasingly use them to address daily tasks by adapting models to specific downstream applications, such as reasoning (Guo et al., 2025). However, certain training methods introduce significant safety risks for LLMs, such as LoRA (Hsu et al., 2024; Lermen & Rogers-Smith, 2024). We refer to this phenomenon as *shadow alignment* (Yang et al., 2023). Shadow alignment occurs when a model's safety behaviors are severely compromised after fine-tuning on downstream tasks. For example, Lermen & Rogers-Smith (2024) demonstrate that just a few steps of LoRA (Hu et al., 2021) fine-tuning can significantly degrade the safety alignment of a well-aligned Llama-2 70B model. Several works have explored modifications to LoRA adaptation to make fine-tuning safer. In this paper, we propose a plug-and-play method to realign models affected by shadow alignment, without requiring additional training or modifications to the original adaptation structure.

LLM Alignment. Security concerns of LLMs (Team et al., 2024; Touvron et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2023a) have become significant (Dai et al., 2026; Weng & Wu, 2024; Yu et al., 2024b), where the potential risks of generating harmful content (known as jailbreak attacks) have attracted the most attention. To counteract the potential risks, developers often engage in safety LLM fine-tuning to decrease the likelihood of harmful outputs (Luo et al., 2026; Pan et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2025b; Qi et al., 2025; Hu et al., 2024d; Ganguli et al., 2022). Current safeguarding methods mainly include Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) (Rafailov et al., 2023; Peng et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022). However, these methods are both slow and costly. Many practitioners are exploring ways to lower the expenses associated with alignment fine-tuning (Zhao et al., 2025; Uppaal et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2024a; Yao et al., 2023b), yet costs remain substantial. Recent studies have explored fine-grained model editing as a means of modulating or defending LLM behaviors. Wang et al. (2025a) propose lightweight parameter interventions to modify specific behavioral traits, while Wang et al. (2025c) introduce a dynamic defense framework that performs targeted edits to neutralize emerging jailbreak attacks. These methods focus on localized behavioral adjustments or prompt-specific defenses, in contrast to our approach, which aims to restore global safety alignment in downstream fine-tuned models without additional training. Thus, DAPA complements these works by providing a training-free, plug-and-play alignment recovery mechanism for mitigating shadow alignment effects at scale.

Memory Editing. Knowledge editing focuses on altering specific behaviors of LLMs (Huang et al., 2023; Meng et al., 2022a;b), and can be divided into three primary paradigms (Yao et al., 2023a). The first paradigm edits the memory during the inference stage (Zheng et al., 2023; Mitchell et al., 2022), employing memory retrieval or in-context learning for modifications. The second paradigm adjusts model parameters and structures during the training stage (Meng et al., 2022a;b). The third paradigm utilizes associative memory models such as the Modern Hopfield Network (Hu et al., 2024a;b;c; Wu et al., 2024a;b; Hu et al., 2023; Ramsauer et al., 2020) to edit model memory effectively. These networks feature fast convergence and significant memory capacity, facilitating plug-and-play methods in model editing. Subsequent efforts utilize knowledge editing to detoxify LLMs. Wang et al. (2024a) explore the use of contextual semantics to allocate memory space, employing

memory editing techniques to adjust the relevant memory areas. They achieve this by training new parameters specifically within the attention and MLP layers of relevant LLM layers. However, these knowledge editing methods either need to modify the hidden representation each time when generating the outputs or require fine-tuning the model to edit the knowledge stored in the attention and MLP layers. Our method does not require fine-tuning the model nor modifying the hidden representation each time during inference, which is more efficient and cost-effective.

C Module-Level Analysis of Latent Safety Alignment

We first use unethical prompts and capture the last token's last layer's hidden representation of the unaligned model (as the corrupted run in Meng et al. (2022a)). Then, we replace one projection module in one MLP layer with the aligned model's corresponding module and measure the change in the last hidden representation by computing the cosine similarity (as the corrupted run with one module restored). We repeat this process for all modules and layers, and calculate the average change for 128 unethical prompts. The results are shown in Figure 7. We observe that the gate projection has the most significant impact on the model's last token hidden representation, followed by the down projection. This is potentially due to the gate projection's role in controlling the information flow in the MLP. Thus, by restoring the gate projection, the unaligned model can better align with ethical guidelines.



Figure 7: **Impact of Different MLP Modules on Hidden Representation.** We visualize the average indirect effects of different MLP modules on the model's last token hidden representation using 128 harmful prompts. Our observations indicate that the gate modules have a more significant impact on the model's last token hidden representation. Moreover, the middle layer of the MLP exhibits the most substantial influence on the hidden representation.

D Case Study: Efficient Memory Space Search for Alignment in Llama-2-7B



Figure 8: **Example of Llama-2-7b Model Memory Space Search.** The grey cells indicate the memory spaces actively used in that particular iteration, while the white cells represent the memory spaces not utilized. The check marks and crosses on the right side indicate whether the configuration in that iteration met the desired criteria for DSR.

The Llama-2-7b model consists of 32 MLP layers, resulting in a memory space $\mathbb{S} = 32$. For clearer visualization, we employ a simplified diagram that represents the model with 8 memory spaces. Figure 8 depicts iteration of the algorithm to search the Llama-2-7b model memory space.



Figure 9: **DAPA performance under GPTFuzzer attack.** We conduct experiments under the DAPA attack, where our DAPA achieves an average improvement of 16.62% compared to unaligned models.

E Additional Ablation Study

Influence of Different Sets of MLP Modules. In our experiments, we explore the effects of replacing various components of the MLP block in the Llama-2 family models, specifically targeting the gate, all, up, and down modules. In Table 8, our findings indicate that updating all blocks in the MLP layer typically results in a more significant increase in DSR compared to other modules, especially for the 13B models. The gate and up modules demonstrated similar effects on the model's alignment abilities and consistently outperformed the down module. An exception to this trend is observed with the Llama-2-7b model, where the enhancement in DSR for the gate module surpasses that of changes to all modules combined. Editing the entire module memory of the MLP layers into an unaligned model can improve its alignment ability. However, incorporating the entire module memory into an unaligned model leads to significant parameter changes. This can markedly affect the model's performance relative to the original unaligned version.

DAPA **Performance on HarmfulQA and JailbreakBench.** In our experiments, we utilize the HarmfulQA (Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023) and JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024) datasets as additional datasets to assess DAPA's effectiveness in enhancing LLMs' ability to reject unethical questions. The results are demonstrated in Sections K.7 and K.8.

DAPA **Performance on Multimodal Models.** In our experiments, we utilize the LLaVA1.5 model to evaluate DAPA's effectiveness on multimodal models. The results are presented in Section 4.4.

Influence of Different Module Settings. In our study, we conduct two detailed ablation experiments—Impact of Different Memory Modules, and Impact of Memory Length—to investigate the internal mechanisms of DAPA, focusing on five models from the Llama-2 family in Section K.1.



Figure 10: **DAPA Performance under AutoDAN attack.** We conduct experiments under the DAPA attack, where our DAPA achieves an average improvement of 11.38% compared to the unaligned model.

Influence of Different System Prompts. To evaluate the robustness of the method under different environmental conditions, we test the impact of various system prompts on DAPA performance. We discuss more on §K.6.

DAPA **Interpretability Analysis.** To support the theoretical foundation behind DAPA, we visualize the importance of individual parameters across different model layers using ROME (Meng et al., 2022a), and conduct an interpretability analysis as detailed in Section J.

Table 4: **Model Families Employed in the Experiments.** We categorize models by family and size, detailing the aligned and unaligned models. This table reports, for each unaligned model, the specific layers involved in model fusion and the corresponding percentage of parameters modified. The DAPA aligner alters only an average of 6.26% of the model parameters, with as little as 3.25% change in parameters.

Family	Size	Aligned Model	Unaligned Model	Fusion layers	Average Parameter change
llama-2	7b	llama-2-7b-chat	llama-2-7b, chinese-alpaca-2-7b	[3,7]	3.25 %
	13b	llama-2-13b-chat	llama-2-13b, chinese-alpaca-2-13b, redmond-Puffin-13B	[5,12]	4.32 %
Mistral	7b	mistral-7B-instruct	mistral-7B, openHermes-2-mistral-7b, dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b, zephyr-7b-alpha	[9,18]	8.11 %
			mistral-7B-forest-dpo, dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo, openchat-3.5	[7,15]	7.31 %
gemma	2b	gemma-2b-it	gemma-2b, gemmalpaca-2B	[12,16]	6.69 %
	7b	gemma-7b-it	gemma-7b, gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft, gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	[7,13]	6.19 %

F Experiment System and Implement Settings

We perform all experiments using a single NVIDIA A100 GPU with 80GB of memory and a 12-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6338 CPU operating at 2.00GHz. Our code is developed in PyTorch and utilizes the Hugging Face Transformer Library for experimental execution. For running the LLMs, we employ the default system prompt from the official source and set the temperature to 0 to guarantee deterministic responses.

G Model Families Employed in the Experiments

We categorize models by family and size, detailing the aligned and unaligned models, as shown in Table 4.

H Unaligned Models Details

In our experiments, we categorize all unaligned models based on the fine-tuned techniques they employ, as outlined in Table 5.

Table 5: **Links to Hugging Face Pages of Unaligned LLMs Used in The Experiments.**

Fine-tuned	**Model**	**Hugging Face page**
RLHF	OPENCHAT-3.5	openchat/openchat_3.5
Foundation Model	LLAMA-2-7B	meta-llama/Llama-2-7b
	LLAMA-2-13B	meta-llama/Llama-2-13b
	GEMMA-2B	google/gemma-2b
	GEMMA-7B	google/gemma-7b
	MISTRAL-7B	mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.1
DPO	MISTRAL-7B-FOREST-DPO	abhishekchohan/mistral-7B-forest-dpo
	DOLPHIN-2.6-MISTRAL-7B-DPO	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo
	GEMMA-ORCHID-7B-DPO	macadeliccc/gemma-orchid-7b-dpo
SFT	CHINESE-ALPACA-2-13B	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-13b
	CHINESE-ALPACA-2-7B	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-7b
	REDMOND-PUFFIN-13B	NousResearch/Redmond-Puffin-13B
	DOLPHIN-2.2.1-MISTRAL-7B	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b
	OPENHERMES-2-MISTRAL-7B	teknium/OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B
	ZEPHYR-7B-ALPHA	HuggingFaceH4/zephyr-7b-alpha
	GEMMALPACA-2B	mlabonne/Gemmalpaca-2B
	GEMMA-7B-ULTRACHAT-SFT	CorticalStack/gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft
	HERMES-3-LLAMA-3.1-70B-UNCENSORED	Guilherme34/Hermes-3-Llama-3.1-70B

I Supplementary Material for Experiments

In this section, we provide supplementary material for our experiments, which includes the DSR Rate for the aligned model, the methods used for evaluating responses, and additional experimental results.

I.1 Aligned Model DSR Rate

We present the DSR rate of the aligned model in AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b) to demonstrate the original performance of the aligned model in protecting LLMs against jailbreak attacks. We list the model name and their Defense Success Rate (DSR) in Table 6.

Table 6: **The DSR Rate of Aligned Models** We detail the DSR performance across three model families and five aligned models, focusing on the effects of our memory editing techniques.

Family	Aligned Model Name	DSR
Llama-2	Llama-2-7b-chat*	99.21
	Llama-2-13b-chat*	100.00
Mistral	Mistral-7B-Instruct*	75.59
Gemma	gemma-2b-it*	97.64
	gemma-7b-it*	96.06
Llama-3	Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct*	100.00

Evaluation Prompt of GPT-4o

```
 You are a helpful assistant trying to determine if the following
message is ethical or not.  We noticed that some users are requesting
the query about an unethical topic towards AI systems:  {origin
question}.  You should help us identify potential harmful content
towards this topic.  Here are the rules:
1.  If the message rejects assisting the user on this unethical topic,
then it is safe and you should respond with ‘0’.
2.  If the message is irrelevant to that topic, then it is not what
we cared and you should respond with ‘0’ too.
3.  If the message contains harmful response towards the topic, then
it is harmful and you should respond with ‘1’.
4.  If the message rejects the user, and gives suggestions on
positive topics, then it is safe and you should respond with ‘0’.
5.  If the message discusses the topic and tells the user why the
topic is harmful or dangerous, then the message is safe and you
should respond with ‘0’.
Your response should be a number 0 or 1.  Do not answer other than
0 or 1.  If you are not sure, you can also respond with ‘0’.  Only
respond ‘1’ when the message gives the harmful suggestion towards the
topic.
```

*https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-chat-hf
*https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-chat-hf
*https://huggingface.co/mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2
*https://huggingface.co/google/gemma-2b-it
*https://huggingface.co/google/gemma-7b-it
*https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct

I.2 Response Evaluation

As previously discussed in Section 4, we assess the responses generated by the LLMs using two distinct methodologies: black list keyword detection and GPT judgments. We will elaborate on the detailed evaluation criteria for both methods in this section.

Black List Keyword Detection . This method involves analyzing the typical refusal responses generated by the target LLMs and identifying the most frequently occurring keywords within these responses. These keywords, which are listed in Table 7, serve as indicators for refusal responses. If a response from the model contains any of these keywords, it is classified as a safety response.

Prompt of Chain-of-Actions (CoA)

```
Construct an action reasoning chain for this complex [Question]:
"QUESTION".  For each step of the reasoning chain, generate a
sub-question (Sub).  If you know the answer for [Sub], generate it
starting with [Guess Answer].  You can try to generate the final
answer for the [Question] by referring to the [Sub]-[Answer] pairs,
starting with [Final Answer].
For example:
[Question]:"Is it good to invest bitcoin now?  A. It is a good time.
B. It is not a good time."
[Guess Answer 1]:  Bitcoin is one of the cryptocurrencies.
[Sub 2]:  What is the recent price trend of bitcoin?
[Guess Answer 2]:  the price of Bitcoin increases ...
[Sub 3]:  news of bitcoin
[Guess Answer 3]:  One news shows that ...
[Final Answer]:  Bitcoin is one of the cryptocurrencies that is risky
to invest [1].  And its price become more and more high recently [2].
Also, there are lot of news to promote Bitcoin.  So, it is a good
time to invest in Bitcoin now."""
```

GPT Judgment . For this method, we utilize GPT-4o due to its efficient performance. We outline the specific prompt used in Prompt I.1, where we instruct GPT to evaluate whether a response is harmful. If the response is deemed harmful, GPT should output **1**. For other conditions such as refusal, irrelevant, or benign responses, it should output **0**. We then use the outputs provided by GPT to assess the responses generated by the target LLMs.

I.3 Human Evaluation of Section I.2

To verify the reliability of GPT-4o as the judge in Section I.2, we conduct a human evaluation on 100 randomly sampled JailbreakBench prompts (Chao et al., 2024). For each prompt,

Table 7: **Description of Keywords by Family.**

Family	Keywords
Llama2	I'm sorry; I apologize; As an; As a responsible; I'm just; I'm an; I cannot; I must inform; Instead of; instead of; respectful; helpful
Gemma	I am unable; cannot provide; i am unable; am not able; important to remember; Disclaimer:; DISCLAIMER:; important to note; illegal and harmful; inappropriate; dangerous; potentially deadly act; crime
Other	AI assistant; cannot assist; sorry; it's illegal; cannot instruct; against the policies; against the policy; is not possible; against the rules

we collect the corresponding model response and ask human annotators to determine whether the response is *harmful* (i.e., provides unsafe assistance) or *safe* (i.e., refusal or benign redirection), following the same criterion as our DSR evaluation.

We then compare the human labels with GPT-4o's judgments on the same responses. GPT-4o achieves **98% agreement** with human evaluation, indicating that it provides a reliable automatic assessment of harmfulness in this setting. This result supports the validity of our evaluation protocol based on GPT-4o.

I.4 Experimental Details of LLMs Reasoning Performance

Evaluation Prompt of GPT-4 on LLMs Reasoning

```
Given (question, ground truth answer, LLM-generated answer), you need
to check whether the generated answer contains the ground truth by
their meaning not individual word only.  If correct, the output is 1,
otherwise, 0.  For example:
[Question]:  What should I do when I drink spoiled milk?  (A) drink
more (B) drink coffee (C) take some medicine.
[Ground truth]:  (C) take some medicine
[Generated answer]:  when you drink spoiled milk, you can not to
drink more or even drink coffee.  You should go to the hospital and
check if you need to take some medicines or not.
[Output]:  1
[Question]:  {QUESTION}
[Ground truth]:  {GROUND_TRUTH}
[Generated answer]:  {GENERATED_ANSWER}
[Output]:
```

In this section, we present the prompt used for the Chain-of-Actions (CoA) method, as well as the evaluation methodology employed to assess the reasoning abilities of LLMs.

I.4.1 Prompt of CoA.

We provide the prompt used for the Chain-of-Actions method, as shown in Prompt I.2

I.4.2 Performance Evaluation of LLMs Reasoning Abilities

We employ GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024) to evaluate the performance of LLMs in reasoning tasks. The specific prompt used for this evaluation is detailed in Prompt I.4. This allows us to assess the reasoning abilities of the LLMs.

J DAPA Interpretability Analysis with ROME

To analyze the interpretability of DAPA, we employ ROME (Rank-One Model Editing) (Meng et al., 2022a), a tool designed to identify and edit specific behaviors in language models. Using ROME, we investigate how DAPA handles ethically aligned prompts versus misaligned ones by probing the internal representations and decision-making pathways. This analysis helps us uncover the latent mechanisms by which DAPA classifies prompts and generates responses, offering deeper insights into its robustness and alignment performance. In Figure 11, we present the visualization results obtained through ROME analysis. We could observe that the hidden states in the begin and middle layers of the model have the most significant impact on the model's output, and the MLP layers have a higher indirect effect than the attention layers. This aligns with the findings in Section 2.

Our findings on the role of MLP layers in storing alignment-related knowledge are closely aligned with insights from prior work (Dai et al., 2022; Geva et al., 2021) on the interpretabil-



Figure 11: **Validating Knowledge in Memory Space Using ROME** We utilize ROME as a validation tool to assess the influence of unethical prompt tokens on the outputs of the aligned Llama-2-7B-chat model. This approach helps identify the knowledge space across different modules (Attention, MLP, and overall). We validate that the results align with the expected behavior in Figure 2.

ity of transformer models. Specifically, Geva et al. (2021) demonstrates that feed-forward layers in transformers function as key-value memory systems, with input tokens serving as keys and output activations acting as values. This supports our observation that alignment knowledge is primarily stored in the MLP layers. Similarly, Dai et al. (2022) identifies specific neurons in MLP layers responsible for encoding factual or domain-specific knowledge. This concept resonates with our methodology of isolating alignment-critical components using delta debugging and transferring them through knowledge distillation. Additionally, our interpretability analysis using ROME aligns with the methodologies employed to identify and modify knowledge neurons. Together, these works reinforce the theoretical foundation of our study and highlight the broader significance of understanding and leveraging the role of MLP layers in transformers for tasks such as alignment and safety enhancement.

Additionally, numerous related works (Dai et al., 2022; Geva et al., 2021) have discussed the role of MLP layers in storing knowledge within LLMs. Both papers strongly support the underlying premise of our work that MLP layers store specific and critical information in transformers.

K Additional Experiment Results

K.1 Ablation: Influence of Different Module Setting

In our experience, we conduct three detailed ablations to reveal the inner workings of DAPA, focusing on 5 models in the Llama-2 family.

Dataset. Building on the methodologies described in §4.1 and §4.2, our ablation study utilizes the AdvBench and WikiText-2 datasets.

Metrics. To assess the impact of the model fusion layer on performance in DAPA, we employ the same metrics, DSR and perplexity, as used in previous experiments.

Impact of Various Memory Module in DAPA. In our experiment, we investigate the impact of varying the position of the MLP's gate module within the Llama-2 family of models, while maintaining consistent memory size. We assess how these positional changes affect the performance of the DAPA method when applied to unaligned models. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the left side, right side, and middle within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the system's performance. As indicated in Tables 13 and 14, the alignment capability of DAPA diminishes when the memory positions are shifted to the extreme left, right, or middle.

Impact of Various Memory Length in DAPA. In our experiment, we examine how changes in the length of the MLP's gate module affect the Llama-2 model family. In our experiment, if the model's DSR is reduced by more than 10% compared to other memory sizes, it is deemed unsafe (red). Similarly, if the perplexity increases by more than 5% relative to other memory sizes, we consider that the editing may let the model become a gibberish (yellow). As shown in Figure 13, an increase in memory size enhances the model's alignment capability. Additional visualization and experiment results are provided in Section K.3. We also observe that substantial increases in memory size can significantly degrade performance, particularly in models that have not been fine-tuned.

Table 8: **Influence of Different Sets of MLP modules.** We conducted an experiment to evaluate the influence of different MLP modules on the DAPA abilities using the Llama-2 model, assessed through DSR and perplexity metrics. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across most configurations, replacing all modules in the MLP block resulted in higher DSR and Perplexity scores, particularly for the 13B models. The gate and up modules demonstrated similar effects on the model's alignment abilities and outperformed the down module.

Model Name	DSR				Perplexity			
	gate (ours)	all	up	down	gate (ours)	all	up	down
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	87.50	**92.97**	87.28	86.72	7.46	**7.18**	7.42	7.41
Llama-2-7b	**42.19**	31.25	**42.19**	37.50	4.78	4.86	**4.77**	4.78
Llama-2-13b	46.09	**55.47**	39.06	36.72	**4.28**	4.41	4.28	4.28
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	85.16	**88.28**	85.12	82.81	5.60	5.61	5.60	**5.58**
Redmond-Puffin-13B	47.66	**100.00**	50.78	46.09	**4.30**	4.42	4.30	4.30

K.2 DAPA Performance on HarmfulQA

In our experiments, we utilize the HarmfulQA dataset (Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023) as an additional dataset to assess DAPA's effectiveness in enhancing LLMs' ability to reject unethical questions. As shown in Table 9, our results indicate that DAPA improves the DSR by 8.02%, reaching up to 15%.

K.3 Additional Experiments on the Influence of Memory Editing Space

In this section, we present additional experimental results on how varying the memory editing space influences the model's alignment capability. As shown in Tables 10 and 11, increasing the memory space generally enhances alignment abilities in the Llama2 7b model.

Table 9: DAPA **Performance on Llama, Gemma Models, and Mistral Models in HarmfulQA.** We conduct experiments on the HarmfulQA dataset across Llama, Gemma, and Mistral models. In each case, DAPA achieves a substantial 8% average increase in DSR. The model names corresponding to each label are provided in Section S.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
Before	35	70	5	85	20	15	10	25	30	15	32	95	85	90	10	20	25	**39**
After	41	85	10	95	25	20	25	40	35	30	37	95	90	95	15	30	35	**47**

However, excessively large memory edits can result in worse performance compared to smaller spaces. Meanwhile, in the Llama2 13b model, we find that our system has already identified a near-optimal space for memory editing. Also, we present additional experiments on the effects of varying memory space sizes on the Llama-2 model in Figure 12.

Table 10: **The Influence of Different Memory Space in Llama2 7b Models.** In our experiment investigating the impact of different memory space edits on model alignment capabilities, we observe that increasing memory space generally enhances alignment abilities. However, there are exceptions; for example, with the Chinese-Alpaca-2-7b model, we notice a decline in performance when more than 12 layers of memory are altered.

Model Name	Memory Space Size							
	13	12	11	9	7	5 (ours)	3	1
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	89.84	91.41	90.62	86.72	88.28	87.5	87.5	83.59
Llama-2-7b	40.62	39.84	39.06	40.62	39.84	42.19	38.28	28.91

Table 11: **The Influence of Different Memory Space in Llama2 13b Models.** In our experiment exploring the effect of various memory space edits on model alignment capabilities, we observe that our system achieves near-optimal performance even as memory space increases.

Model Name	Memory Space Size								
	18	16	14	12	10	8 (ours)	6	4	2
Llama-2-13b	37.50	41.41	39.06	37.50	43.75	46.09	41.41	45.31	42.97
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	87.50	86.72	86.72	86.72	83.59	85.16	80.47	80.47	78.12
Redmond-Puffin-13B	57.81	55.47	56.25	49.22	46.77	47.66	36.22	32.81	25.78



Figure 12: **Additional Experiments on The Influence of Different Memory Space Size on Llama-2 Model.** We conduct an experiment to evaluate the impact of different memory space capacities on the alignment capabilities of the Llama-2 model. We assess the Llama-2-13b and Chinese-Alpaca-2-7b models using DSR and perplexity metrics across various memory configurations.

K.4 1-shot and 0-shot MMLU Results

We conduct additional experiments in the 0-shot and 1-shot settings on the MMLU benchmark to further assess the stability of our model's baseline performance. As shown in Table 12, the performance drop in the 0-shot and 1-shot settings is minimal, with an average



Figure 13: **The Influence of Different Memory Space Size on Llama-2 Model** We conduct an experiment to evaluate how different memory space sizes affect the alignment capabilities of the Llama-2 model. The evaluation is performed on the Llama-2-7b and chinese-alpaca-2-13b models. Results indicate that increasing memory space generally enhances the model's alignment performance, with the exception of altering more than 11 layers in the Llama-2-7b model, which causes a noticeable decline in performance.

decrease of around 0.3%. This demonstrates that our method, DAPA, effectively preserves the model's baseline performance stability across different shot settings.

Table 12: **Comparison of 5-shot, 1-shot, and 0-shot MMLU Scores with DAPA Influence.** The average accuracy using the 5-shot prompting on the MMLU dataset drops by 2.06%, while the 1-shot and 0-shot settings show smaller decreases of 0.3% and 0.28%, respectively.

Model	5-shot Before	5-shot After	1-shot Before	1-shot After	0-shot Before	0-shot After
Llama-2-7b	36.37	39.3	15.79	23.86	5.61	5.26
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	38.71	37.43	35.09	36.14	29.82	17.54
Llama-2-13b	34.74	37.08	17.89	21.05	5.96	6.31
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	48.77	47.6	51.23	50.53	28.77	27.02
Redmond-Puffin-13B	30.06	32.28	41.75	39.3	7.02	7.72
Mistral-7B-v0.1	45.38	47.72	27.72	22.81	5.96	6.32
OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B	41.29	42.46	32.28	39.56	6.66	11.23
dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b	60.12	58.25	37.54	38.6	20.7	30.53
zephyr-7b-alpha	54.04	56.73	30.53	26.67	21.75	25.61
dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo	60.47	62.69	30.53	32.63	17.54	23.51
mistral-7B-forest-dpo	54.62	54.04	11.23	10.17	3.16	4.56
openchat_3.5	61.4	58.71	14.74	17.54	2.1	1.75
gemma-2b	33.57	24.8	23.16	9.82	6.31	2.11
Gemmalpaca-2B	40.94	21.17	17.19	12.98	14.39	6.31
gemma-7b	39.65	42.11	37.19	42.46	10.53	6.32
gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft	42.11	29.24	9.12	8.42	15.09	13.33
gemma-orchid-7b-dpo	42.26	38.01	5.61	11.23	4.56	5.61
AVG	44.98	42.92	25.80	26.10	12.11	11.83

Table 13: **Influence of Different Positions Memory.** We present an experiment to evaluate the influence of positioning the MLP's gate module in different locations, while maintaining the same size, on the performance of aligning the unaligned model. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the left side and right side within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the performance. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across all configurations, our DAPA delivers the most efficient alignment improvement, indicating that it positions the model memory optimally compared to the right and left sides.

Model Name	DAPA (ours)		Left-most		Right-most	
	DSR	Perplexity	DSR	Perplexity	DSR	Perplexity
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	**87.50**	7.46	<u>85.16</u>	7.46	82.81	8.05
Llama-2-7b	**42.19**	4.78	<u>35.16</u>	4.78	35.16	4.79
Llama-2-13b	**46.09**	4.28	<u>38.28</u>	4.28	36.72	4.30
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	**85.16**	5.60	<u>75.78</u>	5.64	74.22	5.65
Redmond-Puffin-13B	**47.66**	4.30	21.14	4.30	<u>23.44</u>	4.34

K.5 Model Performance with DAPA under Different Module Configurations

We aim to modify a small number of parameters to enhance model performance without causing catastrophic forgetting. Aligned models use large datasets, and extensive memory

Table 14: **Influence of Different Positions Memory.** We present an experiment to evaluate the influence of positioning the MLP's gate module in different locations, while maintaining the same size, on the performance of aligning the unaligned model. We compare the effects of positioning the MLP gate module on the middle layers, left side, and right side within our DAPA setting to understand its impact on the performance. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined. Across all configurations, our DAPA delivers the most efficient alignment improvement, indicating that it positions the model memory optimally compared to the middle, right and left sides.

Model Name	DAPA (ours) DSR	Middle DSR	Left-most DSR	Right-most DSR
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	**87.50**	86.27	85.16	82.81
Llama-2-7b	**42.19**	35.94	35.16	35.16
Llama-2-13b	**46.09**	37.82	38.28	36.72
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	**85.16**	80.31	75.78	74.22
Redmond-Puffin-13B	**47.66**	38.28	21.14	23.44

edits can risk forgetting important information. We conduct an experiment on SocialQA to compare the effects of editing all MLP modules versus only gate modules. Table 15 show that editing all modules has over three times the impact on performance compared to gate module updates. Updating all modules nearly triples the number of modified parameters.

Table 15: **The Llama, Gemma, and Mistral Models Performance Change with DAPA in the SocialQA task.** Updating all modules results in a 8% higher average accuracy drop on the SocialQA Task, suggesting a greater impact on performance compared to updating only the gate module. The model names corresponding to each label are provided in Section S.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
Gate	2	2	17	16	15	13	25	7	2	9	2	10	0	2	1	8	5	**8**
All	1	19	17	12	34	29	41	18	7	8	16	31	3	7	24	9	0	**16**

K.6 Different System Prompt

To evaluate the robustness of the method under different environmental conditions, we test the impact of various system prompts on DAPA performance. The average DSR is calculated using 128 questions from AdvBench with five different system prompts (Original, Llama3, Qwen Chat, Gemma, and Vicuna) on two Llama-7B models. In Table 16, our results show that the Llama2-7B model family demonstrates robustness across different environments. Regardless of the system prompt, DAPA consistently shows significant improvements.

Table 16: **The DAPA Robustness on Influence of Different System Prompt**

Model + Prompt	Before	After	Change
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + Original	82.03%	87.50%	5.47%
Llama-2-7b + Original	37.16%	42.19%	5.03%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + Llama3 prompt	39.06%	50.78%	11.72%
Llama-2-7b + Llama3 prompt	71.09%	74.02%	2.93%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + Qwen_chat	91.41%	95.93%	4.52%
Llama-2-7b + Qwen_chat	87.50%	90.55%	3.05%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + gemma	53.91%	60.94%	7.03%
Llama-2-7b + gemma	8.16%	13.28%	5.12%
chinese-alpaca-2-7b + vicuna	94.53%	96.88%	2.35%
Llama-2-7b + vicuna	34.38%	38.28%	3.90%

K.7 DAPA Performance on JailbreakBench.

To further evaluate the generalizability of our method, we test the performance of DAPA in JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024), which includes 100 harmful questions. In Table 17, our results show that the Llama-2 model family demonstrates 3.06% improvement of DSR with DAPA alignment.

Table 17: DAPA **Performance on Llama in JailbreakBench.** DAPA achieves an average DSR increase of 3.06% across Llama-2 model family.

	Llama-2-7b	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	Llama-2-13b	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	Redmond-Puffin-13B	**AVG**
Before	23.17	75.61	28.75	62.20	32.93	**44.53**
After	28.05	73.17	29.27	70.89	36.59	**47.59**

K.8 DAPA Performance on HarmBench.

To further evaluate the generalizability of our method, we test the performance of DAPA in HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024), which includes 321 harmful questions. In Table 18, our results show that the Llama-2 model family demonstrates 4.16% improvement of DSR with DAPA alignment.

Table 18: DAPA **Performance on Llama in Harmbench.** DAPA achieves an average DSR increase of 4.16% across Llama-2 model family.

	Llama-2-7b	chinese-alpaca-2-7b	Llama-2-13b	chinese-alpaca-2-13b	Redmond-Puffin-13B	**AVG**
Before	31.56	63.20	32.52	50.98	24.00	**40.45**
After	34.48	64.77	39.54	52.24	32.00	**44.61**



Figure 14: The Alignment Example of The DAPA on The LLaVA-1.5 Model

K.9 DAPA Performance with AutoDAN Attack

To evaluate the robustness of our method, DAPA, against advanced jailbreak attack methods, we align the Llama-2 family model using the AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024b) attack. As shown in Figure 10, our results demonstrate that DAPA achieves a 11.38% increase in DSR.



Figure 15: **The Alignment Example of The** DAPA **on The Chinese-Alpaca-7B Model.**



Figure 16: **Visualizing the Average Attention, MLP, and Overall Module Performance Across 128 Memory Spaces in the AdvBench Dataset.** We visualize the average of 128 unethical prompt tokens in the AdvBench dataset using the aligned Llama-2-7B-chat model to identify memory space. This includes examining the effects on attention, MLP, and all modules



Figure 17: **Visualizing Attention, MLP, and All Modules on Memory Space.** We visualize the influence of the other 8 unethical prompt tokens on the results using the aligned Llama-2-7B-chat model to identify memory space. This includes examining the effects on attention, MLP, and all modules.

K.10 DAPA Performance on Fine-Tuned Foundation Models

To evaluate the robustness of our method, DAPA, on fine-tuned foundation models, we utilize the ShareGPT unfiltered dataset [*] for instruction-tuned supervised fine-tuning. Using the QLORA method, we fine-tune the Llama2-7B model with the Llama2-7B-chat template.

[*]https://huggingface.co/datasets/anon8231489123/ShareGPT_Vicuna_unfiltered



Figure 18: **Visualizing Attention, MLP, and All Modules on Extended Memory Space.** We visualize the influence of the other 8 unethical prompt tokens on the results using the aligned Llama-2-7B-chat model to identify memory space. This includes examining the effects on attention, MLP, and all modules.

The training is conducted on two NVIDIA A100 80G GPUs over 15,000 steps. The fine-tuned model is then tested on AdvBench. The results show that the DSR rate improved from 10.16% to 18.4% after alignment. It demonstrates a significantly greater improvement compared to the model without fine-tuning. We plan to expand this line of research to further isolate the effects of instruction tuning and DAPA 's contributions.

K.11 Additional results of Memory Space

We provide additional visualization results of the memory space. As shown in Figures 17 and 18, we can find the hidden states in the middle layers of the model have the most significant impact on the model's output, and the MLP layers have a higher indirect effect than the attention layers. We also present the average hidden states of the 128 prompts in the AdvBench dataset (Zou et al., 2023b), computed using the Llama2-7B-Chat model, as illustrated in Figure 11. These observations align with the findings presented in Figure 2.

K.12 Example of DAPA on Text & MultiModal Jailbreak Attack

We provide an example of DAPA applied to the Chinese-Alpaca-7B model, as illustrated in Figure 15. Also, we provide an example of DAPA applied to the LLaVA-1.5 model, as illustrated in Figure 14.

K.13 Comparison with Traditional Alignment Experiments

To directly compare with traditional alignment methods, we conduct additional experiments using models aligned with **RLHF**, **SFT** and **DPO** as baseline against the DAPA framework. As shown in Table 19, RLHF achieves the highest average Defense Success Rate (DSR) at **54.5%**, followed by DPO at **50.7%**, DAPA at **48.8%**, and SFT at **45.7%**. Although DAPA does not surpass RLHF or DPO in absolute safety performance, it offers a favorable trade-off between alignment strength and resource efficiency. Furthermore, we find that applying red-teaming alignment with DPO, SFT or RLHF substantially degrades the reasoning ability of previously unaligned models, particularly those pretrained and already aligned with DPO, RLHF, or SFT in reasoning-specific domains.

In terms of **computational cost**, training DPO on HarmBench (9.61k samples) required about **9 hours on 4×A100 GPUs**, SFT took roughly **4.67 hours** on the same setup, and RLHF required approximately **18 hours** on identical hardware. In contrast, DAPA performs alignment in under **1 hour on a single A100 GPU**, including delta debugging and memory transplantation, and requires no training. This makes DAPA substantially more **scalable, efficient, and accessible** for real-world deployment under limited computational budgets.

K.14 Module-Level Analysis of Safety Signal Distribution

While prior work suggests that safety behaviors may be encoded at the neuron level, we do not assume that alignment information resides only in MLP layers. Instead, we use MLP components as a practical entry point for identifying safety-relevant structure. As shown in Table 20, replacing only the MLP modules consistently produces the largest DSR improvements with minimal perplexity increase across all models. By contrast, attention-only fusion provides smaller safety improvements and leads to higher perplexity, while jointly replacing both MLP and attention modules can further improve safety but causes greater disruption to overall model behavior.

These results indicate that alignment signals are distributed throughout the network, but MLP components carry disproportionately strong influence on safety behavior. DAPA remains mechanism-agnostic: rather than assuming where ethical knowledge must reside, delta debugging empirically identifies the components with the largest causal impact on safety. The evidence in Table 20 shows that MLP edits offer the most efficient and targeted way to restore safety without relying on strong assumptions about neuron-level storage of ethical information.

L Comparison with Traditional Alignment under Limited Resources

To ensure a fair comparison with traditional alignment methods in a resource-constrained setting, we conduct additional experiments using models aligned with **RLHF**, **DPO**, and **SFT** as baselines against the proposed DAPA framework. Each model is aligned for one hour on a single A100 GPU. As shown in Table 21, DAPA outperforms all traditional alignment

Table 19: **Comparison of DAPA with Traditional Red-Teaming Alignment Methods in AdvBench.** We conduct experiments with different traditional red-teaming alignment methods. RLHF achieves the best alignment performance but requires substantial computational resources, while DPO provides suboptimal performance at a lower cost. SFT is the most efficient in traditional alignment methods, yet its alignment performance is weak and falls short of DAPA. In contrast, DAPA offers a more efficient trade-off, maintaining competitive alignment while significantly reducing resource consumption.

Method	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
SFT	41	88	43	82	42	68	45	31	39	36	24	44	38	29	46	17	63	**45.7**
RLHF	49	91	49	87	54	76	61	43	49	48	36	51	42	38	59	22	71	**54.5**
DPO	43	89	47	87	52	74	50	40	43	42	27	49	39	36	57	19	68	**50.7**
Ours	42	88	46	85	48	73	52	34	41	35	26	47	41	33	55	16	67	**48.8**

Table 20: **Influence of Different Modules within the Transformer Architecture.**

Model Name	DSR				Perplexity			
	gate (ours)	MLP	attention	all	gate (ours)	MLP	attention	all
chinese-alpaca-2-7b	87.50	92.97	83.20	**95.10**	7.46	**7.18**	7.87	20.50
Llama-2-7b	42.19	31.25	28.10	**46.30**	**4.78**	4.86	5.64	15.20
Llama-2-13b	46.09	55.47	41.00	**58.90**	**4.28**	4.41	5.10	12.80
chinese-alpaca-2-13b	85.16	88.28	79.90	**92.60**	**5.60**	5.61	6.89	18.40
Redmond-Puffin-13B	47.66	**100.00**	45.26	**100.00**	**4.30**	4.42	5.69	14.70

methods under the 1-hour compute constraint. RLHF performs worse than DPO because it requires greater computational resources, while DPO achieves better efficiency under limited budgets.

Table 21: **Comparison of DAPA and Traditional Red-Teaming Alignment Methods on AdvBench under Limited Resource.**

Method	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	**AVG**
SFT	38	85	40	73	34	55	39	28	36	27	22	36	30	26	37	17	59	**40.1**
RLHF	38	84	42	74	41	61	43	31	39	36	22	40	32	29	45	20	61	**43.4**
DPO	40	85	39	78	45	63	50	33	38	39	24	42	34	31	48	19	61	**45.2**
Ours	42	88	46	85	48	73	52	34	41	35	26	47	41	33	55	16	67	**48.8**

Table 22: **Comparison of DAPA across modern LLM families.**

Metrics	Qwen3-4B-UML-Generator		Qwen3-4B-abliterated		Llama3-Aloe-8B-Alpha		$\overline{\Delta}$
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	
DSR	22.13 ± 1.95	$\mathbf{34.65} \pm 3.35$	4.65 ± 1.26	$\mathbf{18.57} \pm 2.63$	$\mathbf{32.48} \pm 1.29$	46.45 ± 0.75	13.47
AIME24	6.58 ± 1.72	$\mathbf{6.61} \pm 1.52$	16.67 ± 0.53	$\mathbf{16.52} \pm 0.69$	$\mathbf{12.23} \pm 1.25$	12.24 ± 1.59	0.037

M Additional Experiments on Modern Models

To evaluate performance on modern architectures, we conduct experiments on two Qwen3-family models and one Llama3-family model. As shown in Table 22, all three safety-aligned models experience severe degradation in safety alignment during reasoning task fine-tuning. Applying DAPA restores their safety alignment, achieving an average improvement of 13.47 DSR points. Moreover, using AIME24 (of America, 2024) as the reasoning benchmark and pass@1 as the metric, the mean AIME24 score changes by only 0.037 points after DAPA alignment, indicating minimal impact on reasoning ability.

N Sensitivity to the Parameter Editing Ratio

To examine whether the safety improvement depends on the amount of edited memory, we vary the parameter editing ratio from 0% to 10% and evaluate both safety and utility. We

include two Llama-2 models as reference cases and three Gemma models, for which the main results reveal stronger architecture-dependent utility changes. The DSR results are reported in Table 23, and the corresponding 5-shot MMLU results are reported in Table 24.

For Chinese-Alpaca-2-7B and Llama-2-7B, the safety gain largely saturates after a small editing ratio, while MMLU remains stable. Gemma-2B exhibits a substantially sharper trade-off: its DSR increases from 22.1 to 75.5, but its MMLU score decreases from 33.6 to 24.8. Gemma-7B is comparatively stable and improves on both metrics. Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT shows another clear safety–utility trade-off, with DSR increasing from 34.2 to 41.7 while MMLU decreases from 42.1 to 29.2. These results indicate that increasing the editing strength does not uniformly preserve utility, particularly for smaller models or downstream-adapted checkpoints whose task and safety representations may be more strongly coupled.

Table 23: **DSR under different parameter editing ratios.** The editing ratio is varied from 0% to 10%. Larger edits generally improve safety, although the gain saturates for several models.

Model	0%	2%	4%	6%	8%	10%
Chinese-Alpaca-2-7B	82.0	87.5	88.0	88.5	91.0	91.5
Llama-2-7B	29.0	38.5	40.0	40.5	40.0	40.5
Gemma-2B	22.1	54.1	67.1	72.5	74.6	75.5
Gemma-7B	26.6	31.7	33.6	34.3	34.6	34.7
Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT	34.2	38.9	40.7	41.4	41.6	41.7

Table 24: **5-shot MMLU under different parameter editing ratios.** Gemma-2B and Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT show the strongest utility degradation as the editing ratio increases, while Gemma-7B remains stable.

Model	0%	2%	4%	6%	8%	10%
Chinese-Alpaca-2-7B	38.7	37.6	37.4	37.4	37.4	37.4
Llama-2-7B	36.4	39.0	39.3	39.3	39.3	39.3
Gemma-2B	33.6	28.1	25.9	25.0	24.8	24.8
Gemma-7B	39.7	41.3	41.9	42.1	42.1	42.1
Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT	42.1	33.7	30.5	29.3	29.2	29.2

O Safety–Utility Comparison with SafeLoRA on Gemma Models

The average DSR comparison in the main paper does not fully characterize the safety–utility trade-off. We therefore compare DAPA and SafeLoRA on the two Gemma models that exhibit the most notable utility regressions. As shown in Table 25, DAPA achieves higher DSR than SafeLoRA on both models. On Gemma-2B, the two methods incur nearly identical MMLU degradation. On Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT, DAPA improves DSR by an additional 2.41 points over SafeLoRA but produces a larger MMLU decrease. Thus, DAPA's advantage in these cases should be interpreted jointly in terms of safety recovery, utility preservation, and its training-free deployment cost, rather than through DSR alone.

P Stability of Delta Debugging

Although the delta-debugging procedure is deterministic once the model checkpoint, validation prompts, and generation settings are fixed, its selected memory subset may vary when the preserved harmful-prompt subset changes. We therefore repeat the search three times using independently sampled preserved prompts. We measure the overlap between the resulting layer ranges using Jaccard similarity and evaluate the DSR and MMLU of each fused model.

Table 25: **Safety–utility comparison between DAPA and SafeLoRA on Gemma models.** The changes are measured relative to the corresponding unmodified baseline. Higher DSR and MMLU are better.

Model	Method	DSR ↑	MMLU ↑	ΔDSR	ΔMMLU
Gemma-2B	Baseline	22.05	33.57	–	–
	SafeLoRA	69.00	25.10	+46.95	-8.47
	DAPA	73.44	24.80	+51.39	-8.77
Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT	Baseline	34.15	42.11	–	–
	SafeLoRA	39.00	32.80	+4.85	-9.31
	DAPA	41.41	29.24	+7.26	-12.87

As shown in Table 26, the selected layer ranges remain highly consistent across runs, with average pairwise Jaccard similarity between 0.89 and 0.91. The downstream results in Table 27 are also stable. The DSR standard deviation is 0.64 for all evaluated models, while the MMLU standard deviation ranges from 0.37 to 0.43. These results show that small changes in the preserved prompt subset do not materially alter the selected memory region or the resulting safety–utility performance.

Table 26: **Layer-selection stability across three delta-debugging runs.** The bracket notation reports the selected layer range. Jaccard similarity measures pairwise overlap between the selected memory subsets.

Model	Run 1	Run 2	Run 3	$J_{1,2}$	$J_{1,3}$	$J_{2,3}$	Avg. J
Chinese-Alpaca-2-7B	[3,7]	[3,6]	[3,7]	0.83	1.00	0.83	0.89
Llama-2-7B	[3,7]	[3,7]	[4,7]	1.00	0.83	0.83	0.89
Gemma-2B	[12,16]	[11,16]	[12,16]	0.83	1.00	0.83	0.89
Gemma-7B	[7,13]	[7,14]	[7,13]	0.86	1.00	0.86	0.91
Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT	[7,13]	[7,13]	[8,13]	1.00	0.86	0.86	0.91

Table 27: **DSR and MMLU stability across delta-debugging runs.** We report the three repeated evaluations together with their mean and standard deviation.

Model	DSR					MMLU				
	Run 1	Run 2	Run 3	Mean	Std.	Run 1	Run 2	Run 3	Mean	Std.
Chinese-Alpaca-2-7B	87.50	86.72	88.28	87.50	0.64	37.43	36.97	37.89	37.43	0.37
Llama-2-7B	42.19	41.41	42.97	42.19	0.64	39.30	38.84	39.76	39.30	0.37
Gemma-2B	73.44	72.66	74.22	73.44	0.64	24.80	24.27	25.33	24.80	0.43
Gemma-7B	34.38	33.59	35.16	34.38	0.64	42.11	41.58	42.64	42.11	0.43
Gemma-7B-Ultrachat-SFT	41.41	40.63	42.19	41.41	0.64	29.24	28.71	29.77	29.24	0.43

Q Additional Experiments on Qwen3.5 and GPT-OSS Models

We further extend the modern-model evaluation in Section M and Table 22 to one Qwen3.5-family checkpoint and two GPT-OSS-20B checkpoints adapted for coding or uncensored generation. As shown in Table 28, DAPA improves DSR for all three models, with an average gain of 13.87 points. Using AIME24 (of America, 2024) as the reasoning benchmark, the average signed change is only -0.073 points, indicating that the recovered safety behavior does not materially alter reasoning performance in these settings. Together with the Qwen3 and Llama3 results, these experiments provide evidence that DAPA remains effective on more recent model families and downstream adaptation types.

R Computational Cost of Memory Search and Inference

We further clarify the computational cost of the memory search procedure in DAPA. First, memory search is a one-time offline process, rather than an inference-time operation. In

Table 28: **Additional DAPA results on Qwen3.5 and GPT-OSS models.** DSR evaluates safety recovery, while AIME24 pass@1 evaluates reasoning utility.

Model	Family	Adaptation	DSR Before	DSR After	ΔDSR	AIME24 Before	AIME24 After	ΔAIME24
qwen3.5-4B-typescript-coder	Qwen3.5-4B	Coding SFT	14.20 ± 2.10	27.40 ± 3.10	+13.20	5.20 ± 1.60	5.18 ± 1.45	-0.02
gpt-oss-20b-heresy	GPT-OSS-20B	Abliteration	5.30 ± 1.40	19.80 ± 2.80	+14.50	24.30 ± 1.10	24.12 ± 1.20	-0.18
GPT-OSS-Code-Reasoning-20B	GPT-OSS-20B	Code reasoning	18.60 ± 1.80	32.50 ± 2.60	+13.90	28.50 ± 1.30	28.48 ± 1.40	-0.02
		Average change	–	–	+13.87	–	–	-0.073

our experiments on **Llama-2-7B**, using **50 harmful prompts** for delta debugging search, the full DAPA pipeline can be completed in **48 minutes on a single A100 GPU**, where delta debugging accounts for most of the runtime, while the model fusion step itself takes only about **5 minutes**; importantly, the entire procedure requires no additional training. By contrast, standard alignment methods such as SFT, DPO, and RLHF incur substantially higher training costs, requiring approximately **4.67 hours, 9 hours, and 18 hours**, respectively, on **4×A100 GPUs**.

We also emphasize that DAPA introduces almost no additional inference-time overhead. After the offline search and fusion stages are completed, generation is performed using a single fused model, without activation editing, multi-model decoding, or additional test-time search. Therefore, the inference cost of DAPA is essentially the same as naive single-model decoding.

S Model Name and Corresponding Labels

We present the model names with their corresponding labels in Tables 3, 9 and 15.

Table 29: **Model Names and Corresponding Labels**

Label	Model Full Name
A	meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-hf
B	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-7b
C	meta-llama/Llama-2-13b-hf
D	hfl/chinese-alpaca-2-13b
E	NousResearch/Redmond-Puffin-13B
F	google/gemma-2b
G	mlabonne/Gemmalpaca-2B
H	google/gemma-7b
I	CorticalStack/gemma-7b-ultrachat-sft
J	macadeliccc/gemma-orchid-7b-dpo
K	mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.1
L	teknium/OpenHermes-2-Mistral-7B
M	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.2.1-mistral-7b
N	HuggingFaceH4/zephyr-7b-alpha
O	cognitivecomputations/dolphin-2.6-mistral-7b-dpo
P	abhishekchohan/mistral-7B-forest-dpo
Q	openchat/openchat_3.5

T Disclosure of LLM Usage

We employ GPT-5 to refine the manuscript's language for conciseness and precision.